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Comments
Leveling the Playing Field:
Relevant Product Market Definition in
Sports Franchise Relocation Cases
At the turn of the twenty-first century, reading the sports
pages has become more like reading the business pages. Fran-
chise owners uproot popular teams for new stadia and higher
revenues elsewhere; professional sports leagues pit cities against
each other in the struggle for expansion teams; and players de-
mand unheard-of salaries and lucrative trades-this is the stuff
of major league professional sports today. It is no wonder, then,
that it seems like athletes and sports teams spend more time in
court than on the playing field.'
As cities and fans are well aware, sports franchises are valu-
able commodities.2 The fact that professional sports leagues have
not expanded sufficiently to meet the demand for franchises fur-
ther enhances their value.3 Therefore, cities without teams are
often willing to make huge concessions in order to lure teams
1 See Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace
Competition in the Marketplace? 60 Term L Rev 263, 263 (1993).
2 The New York Yankees, for example, were valued at $362 million and their esti-
mated yearly revenue was $114.7 million in 1997. See <http://www.forbes.com/forbes/
98/1214/6213124tab1.htm> (visited Jan 29, 2000). The impact of having a major league
professional sports team to a city's economy can be great. See Richard Amoroso, Control-
ling Professional Sports Team Relocations: The Oakland Raiders' Antitrust Case and Be-
yond, 17 Rutgers L J 283, 283 (1986) (estimating that in 1984 alone, after Robert Irsay,
owner of the [now] Indianapolis Colts, moved the team from Baltimore, Baltimore's econ-
omy lost thirty million dollars in revenue, wages and business).
3 See generally Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 Minn L Rev 643, 656-
70 (1989); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of Profes-
sional Sports Leagues, 57 Ohio St L J 1677 (1996); James Quirk and Rodney D. Fort, Pay
Dirt 294-327 (Princeton 1992); James Quirk and Rodney Fort, Hard Ball 171-86 (Prince-
ton 1999).
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away from their home cities or to acquire new expansion fran-
chises.' Home cities, in response, attempt to meet or surpass any
offers made by outsiders.5 Although not required by any league's
rules, franchise owners who relocate their teams may have to pay
a relocation fee to the league.6 Furthermore, when a franchise
owner seeks to relocate to an area occupied by another team,
league rules require supermajority approval of the other league
franchise owners.' Such rules are known as "franchise relocation
restrictions."
The relocation of well-supported teams obviously hurts home
cities, their taxpayers and fans.8 However, leagues do not use
franchise relocation restrictions only to protect cities, taxpayers
and fans. In addition, relocation restrictions shelter existing fran-
4 See John Wunderli, Squeeze Play: The Game of Owners, Cities, Leagues and Con-
gress, 5 Marq Sports L J 83, 83-87 (1994) (giving examples of concessions made by home
cities). St. Louis, for example, agreed to pay the Los Angeles Rams $15 million for team
relocation costs and $30 million to pay off the debt the team owed the City of Anaheim,
and to complete unfinished work at the team's new home stadium, the brand-new $260
million Trans World Dome. Sanjay Jos6 Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free
Agency and the New Economics of the NFL, 7 Marq Sports L J 1, 4 (1996).
5 In 1984, Leonard Tose, owner of the Philadelphia Eagles, threatened to relocate the
Eagles unless local banks and investors agreed to help him refinance his forty-million-
dollar personal debt. See Amoroso, 17 Rutgers L J at 283-84 (cited in note 2). Philadel-
phia's mayor orchestrated an agreement to keep the team, which included a commitment
from the city to construct fifty luxury skyboxes, a deferral of the Eagles' rent on the sta-
dium for ten years, and an agreement to increase the percentage of revenues the Eagles
receive from food and beverage concessions at the stadium and to provide the Eagles with
parking revenues from the stadium. Id at 284 n 7. See also Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at 1702
n 118 (cited in note 3) (recounting some recent threats of team relocations and home cities'
responses).
6 Some commentators have suggested that the real reason the National Football
League ("NFL") approved the Rams' move to St. Louis was because the Rams agreed to
pay the NFL a $71 million 'relocation fee.' See Mullick, 7 Marq Sports L J at 7, 11 n 55
(cited in note 4) (noting that the owners originally voted 21-3 (with five abstentions)
against the Rams move, but then voted 23-6 in favor, after securing the relocation fee).
See also Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 124 (cited in note 3) (stating that Art Modell, owner
of the [now] Baltimore Ravens, had to "cough up" some of his gains to the NFL when he
moved his Cleveland Browns to Baltimore).
7 See, for example, NFL Const & By-Laws, Art IV, § 4.3 (requiring a 75 percent vote
of owners before members can transfer their franchise to a different city); NBA Const
§ 9(a) (requiring majority vote for franchise move after consideration of various objective
factors). League approval, however, can likely be bought when the price is right. Christian
M. McBurney, The Legality of Sports Leagues' Restrictive Admissions Practices, 60 NYU L
Rev 925, 927 (1985) (stating that consent to move into another team's home territory
"usually must be purchased" and giving example). Modell's payment to the NFL is espe-
cially revealing because the move relocated his team in close proximity to the Washington
Redskins. The NFL's decision not to block this relocation could arguably have been influ-
enced by Modell's agreement to give to the League some of the gains he received. Quirk
and Fort, Hard Ball at 124 (cited in note 3).
8 See generally Wunderli, 5 Marq Sports L J at 91-96 (cited in note 4) (giving exam-
ples of how such moves have harmed cities and taxpayers).
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chises from the competition that would ensue if other league
teams moved into their home areas. A major city like Los Ange-
les, for example, could likely support more than one team in any
given league However, league rules are structured to preclude
relocations into such megalopolis cities. These rules, in turn, dis-
courage investments by individuals or groups seeking to purchase
and relocate existing teams. By imposing constraints on invest-
ment, league rules distort the sports franchise market and im-
pose artificial barriers to competitive forces within that market.
Despite this distortion, judicial and scholarly attention rarely
focuses upon the sports franchise market. Instead, most courts
and commentators evaluate relocation restrictions in terms of
their effects upon fans. Therefore, most evaluations of franchise
relocation restrictions are incomplete. As a result, injured par-
ticipants in the sports franchise market, such as potential buyers
of existing franchises, lack meaningful redress in the antitrust
laws. This Comment attempts to improve the sports franchise
relocation debate by analyzing the impact of relocation restraints
on the sports franchise market.
Part I of this Comment will review why relevant product
market definition is important to antitrust analysis. Part II will
explain the function of antitrust laws in the sports industry and
their application to sports franchise relocation restraints. Part III
will evaluate the three dominant relevant product market defini-
tions that are used in sports-related cases: the entertainment
market, the single-sport market, and the market for sports fran-
chises.
Part IV will demonstrate that the market for sports fran-
chises is the proper product market definition for relocation cases
for two reasons. First, the anticompetitive effects of franchise re-
location restraints directly impact the market for sports fran-
chises. Second, given the harm to consumer interests in the
sports franchise market, those interests deserve protection under
the antitrust laws. Defining the product market as the market for
sports franchises is both consistent with federal court jurispru-
dence and responsive to consumer welfare concerns.
9 Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 178 (cited in note 3) (arguing that New York and
similar megalopolis cities could support several teams in any one league).
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I. GENERAL ANTITRUST DOCTRINE
As early as the 1920s, courts scrutinized professional sports
leagues under the federal antitrust laws.1° Although the Supreme
Court exempted professional baseball from the antitrust laws,1
the Court never extended this protection to the other professional
sports leagues. 2 Indeed, the antitrust laws have been a powerful
tool for individuals and groups seeking to challenge major sports
leagues' power and authority.
A. Sherman Act § 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Act13 prohibits conspiracies or coor-
dinated group activity designed to restrain trade among those
who would otherwise be competitors or sellers. 4 Since virtually
every contract restrains trade to some degree, the Supreme Court
has interpreted § 1 as prohibiting only unreasonable restraints of
10 See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc v National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 US 200 (1922) (holding baseball exempt from federal antitrust laws).
11 Id at 208-09. Many now consider Major League Baseball's ("MLB's") exemption
from the antitrust laws to be an unjustifiable anomaly. See Flood v Kuhn, 407 US 258,
282 (1972) (recognizing as an "aberration" Federal Baseball and its progeny). As discussed
extensively in scholarly literature, neither judicial nor congressional attempts to remove
MLB's exemption have been successful. See generally Julie Dorst, Franchise Relocation:
Reconsidering Major League Baseball's Carte Blanche Control, 4 Seton Hall J Sports L 553
(1994); Thomas R. Hurst and Jeffrey M. McFarland, The Effect of Repeal of the Baseball
Antitrust Exemption on Franchise Relocations, 8 DePaul-LCA J Art & Ent L 263 (1998);
Joshua Hamilton, Comment, Congress in Relief: The Economic Importance of Revoking
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 38 Santa Clara L Rev 1223, 1241-42, 1244-51 (1998);
Edmund P. Edmonds, The Curt Flood Act of 1998: A Hollow Gesture After All These Years?
9 Marq Sports L J 315 (1999).
12 See generally Haywood v National Basketball Association, 401 US 1204 (1971)
(basketball); Radovich v National Football League, 352 US 445 (1957) (football); United
States v International Boxing Club, 348 US 236 (1954) (boxing); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc v
United States Tennis Association, Inc, 511 F Supp 1103 (D Neb), affd per curiam, 665 F2d
222 (8th Cir 1981) (tennis); Blalock v Ladies Professional Golf Association, 359 F Supp
1260 (N D Ga 1973) (golf); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc v Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc, 351 F Supp 462 (E D Pa 1972) (hockey).
13 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in the restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states ... is declared to be illegal." 15 USC § 1 (1994). Regardless of the nature of
the practice challenged, three elements must be established to prove a violation of § 1:
(1) the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy among two or more separate
entities that (2) unreasonably restrains trade and (3) affects interstate or foreign com-
merce. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 2 (ABA 4th ed 1997)
(citations omitted).
14 See Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports
Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U Miami L Rev 729, 735
(1989).
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trade. 5 In the context of sports leagues, the "rule of reason" usu-
ally determines whether a restraint is unreasonable.16
The relevant inquiry under the rule of reason is whether the
restraint "is one that promotes competition or one that sup-
presses competition." 7 If the rule of reason analysis reveals that
the restraint has a net procompetitive effect, or an "insubstantial"
net anticompetitive effect, the restraint is lawful." If, however,
the restraint's tendency to injure competition outweighs its ten-
dency to enhance competition, the restraint violates the Sherman
Act. 19
B. Public Policy Concerns
Federal antitrust legislation and Supreme Court antitrust
jurisprudence are aimed at enhancing consumer welfare.2" The
Court has both explicitly and implicitly recognized the impor-
tance of maintaining competition2' in order to protect
consumers.
22
15 See Standard Oil Co v United States, 221 US 1, 60-70 (1911).
16 The rule of reason has emerged as .the proper test for evaluating sports leagues
under § 1. See, for example, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v National Foot-
ball League, 726 F2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir 1984); Smith v Pro Football, Inc, 593 F2d 1173,
1179-82 (DC Cir 1978); Mackey v National Football League, 543 F2d 606, 618-20 (8th Cir
1976). See also Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation
Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 Fordham L Rev 157, 175-206 (1984) (discussing
propriety of the rule of reason versus the rule of per se illegality for sports leagues). The
other method available is the per se rule of illegality, which condemns certain categories of
restraints such as horizontal price-fixing and market allocation agreements among com-
petitors without inquiry into their actual effect on competition or the purpose for their use.
Antitrust Law Developments at 40 (cited in note 13).
17 National Society of Professional Engineers v United States, 435 US 679, 691 (1978).
18 Antitrust Law Developments at 59 (cited in note 13).
19 See Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246 US 231, 238 (1918).
20 See Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single En-
tity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82
Mich L Rev 1, 10-14 (1983) (arguing that antitrust law's only proper goal is to maximize
consumer welfare). But see Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of
Competition and its Practice, 48-52 (West 1994) (discussing other policies potentially
underlying antitrust laws, such as economic efficiency, distributive monopoly prevention,
and protection of small businesses).
21 Robert Bork has argued that for purposes of antitrust analysis, the word "competi-
tion" should be used only as a term of art identifying market behavior that enhances con-
sumer welfare. Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 58-61
(Basic 1978).
22 See Grauer, 82 Mich L Rev at 7-14 (cited in note 20), discussing Continental TV,
Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 53 n 21 (1977) and Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc, 441 US 1, 8-9 n 13 (1979) ("BM) as indications that the Court
recognizes that antitrust law's proper goal is to maximize consumer welfare. Indeed, the
Court has explicitly declared that "Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer
250 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2000:
The antitrust laws condemn restraints of competition, which
allow firms to take unfair advantage of consumers by raising
prices and reducing output.23 Thus, in order to qualify as reason-
able under the antitrust laws, a restraint of trade must not di-
minish output.24
C. Relevant Product Market Definition
Defining the relevant market is a threshold step in nearly all
antitrust cases.25 A "market" is the group of sellers or producers
who have the potential to exert market power; that is, the "actual
or potential ability to deprive each other of significant levels of
business."2' A relevant market has two components: (1) the rele-
vant product market, which identifies the products or services
that compete with each other, and (2) the relevant geographic
market, which describes the geographic area in which the sellers
could act monopolistically if they were to coordinate their
actions.27
welfare prescription." Reiter v Sonotone Corp, 442 US 330, 343 (1979) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
23 See Robert C. Heintel, The Need for an Alternative to Antitrust Regulation of the
National Football League, 46 Case W Res L Rev 1033, 1040 (1996). See also National
Collegiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85,
107 (finding NCAA television restrictions unlawful because "[pirice is higher and output
lower than they would otherwise be, and both are unresponsive to consumer preference");
BMI, 441 US at 19-20 ("[Olur inquiry must focus on whether ... the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output ... or instead one designed to increase economic efficiency and render
markets more, rather than less, competitive.") (quotation marks omitted).
24 Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity
Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 Ind L J 25, 53 (1991) ("Economic theory informs us
that with decreased output comes higher prices, and common sense advises that decreased
output also brings with it the prospect of a smaller variety of goods, as well as a smaller
number, and thus the prospect of diminished consumer choice.").
25 Wynne S. Carvill, Antitrust Issues in Management of Intellectual Property, 566
PLI/Pat 59, 67 (1999) ("Almost all antitrust principles have as their touchstone the con-
cept of a relevant market."); Continental TV, Inc v GTE Sylvania, Inc, 433 US 36, 53 n 21
(1977) ("[AIn antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objec-
tive benchmarks").
26 Thurman Industries v Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc, 875 F2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir 1989).
See also Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 US 451, 464 (1992) (de-
fining market power as "the ability of a single seller to raise prices and restrict output")
(citation omitted).
27 See Antitrust Law Developments at 493 (citations omitted) (cited in note 13); Car-
vill, 566 PLI/Pat at 67 (cited in note 25).
245] SPORTS FRANCHISE RELOCATION
1. Product market definition.
Generally, two products or services are in the same relevant
product market, even though they are not identical to each other,
if purchasers of the products view them as being reasonably in-
terchangeable for the purpose for which they are produced.28
"Reasonable interchangeability of use," also referred to as "de-
mand substitutability" or "cross-elasticity," refers to consumers'
practical ability to switch from one product to another.29 Thus,
when the presence of one product acts as a price constraint on
another product, the two products are in the same market."°
2. Geographic market definition.
A geographic market is defined by identifying the geographic
area in which buyers look to purchase products included in the
relevant product market.3' As with relevant product markets, the
geographic market determination in a particular case depends
upon cross-elasticity of demand. 2 While certain criteria have
been proposed to help make the geographic market determina-
tion,33 these factors are not conclusive. Instead, the Supreme
28 See James L. Seal, Market Definition in Antitrust Litigation in the Sports and the
Entertainment Industries, 61 Antitrust L J 737, 737-38 (1993), citing United States v E I
du Pont de Nemours & Co, 351 US 377, 404 (1956).
29 Antitrust Law Developments at 500 (cited in note 13). The cross-elasticity of de-
mand between two products measures the extent to which the quantity demanded of the
first product will change in response to a change in the price of the second product. Id at
503. See also FTC v Staples, Inc, 970 F Supp 1066, 1076 (DC Cir 1997) (finding that a
slight but significant nontransitory price increase by Staples would not cause a consider-
able number of Staples customers to purchase consumable office products from nonsuper-
store alternatives, but instead would cause customers to turn to another office superstore);
Drinkwine v Federated Publications, Inc, 780 F2d 735, 738 n 3 (9th Cir 1985) (noting that
display advertisements in daily newspapers were not a relevant market because "door-to-
door delivery, direct mail and the weekly papers [were] viable substitutes").
30 See McBurney, 60 NYU L Rev at 934 (cited in note 7). Indicia of substitutability
include: "(1) evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting purchases be-
tween products in response to relative changes in price or other competitive variables; (2)
evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of buyer substitution between
products; and (3) the timing and costs of switching products." Seal, 61 Antitrust L J at 738
(cited in note 28).
31 See Carvill, 566 PLI/Pat at 68 (cited in note 25). See also United States v Grinnell
Corp, 384 US 563, 570-71 (1966) (defining the relevant geographic market as the "area in
which a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services he or she seeks").
32 Antitrust Law Developments at 533, 543 n 178 (cited in note 13). The cross-
elasticity of demand for a single product between two different geographic areas measures
the extent to which the quantity of the product demanded in the first area will change in
response to a change in the price of the product in the second area. Id at 533.
33 These factors include actual sale patterns, relationship among prices and price
movements between areas, transprtatii costs, industry practices, and the nature and
scope of the anti-competitive effect at issue in a particular case. Id at 533-39.
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Court has stated that "Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual
approach to the definition of the relevant market and not a for-
mal, legalistic one. The geographic market selected must there-
fore both correspond to the commercial realities of the industry
and be economically significant."34
3. The importance of a narrowly tailored product
market definition.
The relevant product market definition in any antitrust case
must conform to the antitrust challenge being made." If a court
defines a product market without regard to the particulars of the
industry, the resulting definition may shed little light on the ef-
fects of the restraint under examination. In a case involving al-
leged harm to distributors of first-run movies, for example, the
relevant product market consists of products that distributors
consider reasonable substitutes.37 This is true regardless of
moviegoers' or other consumers' preferences.3"
Relevant product market definition involves identifying the
alleged antitrust violation, the actors purportedly harmed by the
alleged violation, and the product market within which the injury
occurs. Sports franchise relocation cases present special market
definition difficulties because sports leagues operate in a variety
of different product markets and may be subjected to multiple
allegations of antitrust liability in any or all of these various
product markets.39
II. ANTITRUST AND THE SPORTS INDUSTRY
Professional sports leagues are subject to scrutiny under both
§§ 1 and 24" of the Sherman Act.4 While disagreement abounds
34 Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294, 336-37 (1962).
35 See Seal, 61 Antitrust L J at 744 (cited in note 28).
36 Id at 744-45.
37 United States v Syufy Enterprises, 903 F2d 659, 665 n 9 (9th Cir 1990).
38 See Seal, 61 Antitrust L J at 753 (cited in note 28) (explaining that the relevant
question in Syufy was whether the distributors viewed theatrical release as a means of
distribution interchangeable with video and cable, regardless of the movie patrons' prefer-
ences).
39 See Ross, 73 Minn L Rev at 647 (cited in note 3) (citing different markets in which
sports leagues operate). See also notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
40 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization of trade and attempts to
monopolize trade. 15 USC § 2 (1994). To demonstrate attempted monopolization, a plain-
tiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct
with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving mo-
nopoly power. Spectrum Sports, Inc v McQuillan, 506 US 447, 456 (1993). Rival leagues
252 [2000:
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on substantive liability issues, virtually everyone agrees that pro-
fessional sports is a unique industry to which traditional anti-
trust doctrine is not easily applied.
A. Rule of Reason Versus Per Se Illegality
The rule of reason, rather than the per se rule of illegality,
applies to most cases involving sports leagues.43 According to the
Supreme Court, the rule of reason is the more appropriate ap-
proach to "an industry in which horizontal restraints on competi-
tion are essential if the product is to be available at all."4
In order for a league to survive, its member teams must com-
pete on the field while cooperating off the field.45 Such coordina-
tion among on-field competitors markedly differs from other
have brought § 2 cases, claiming that an established league deliberately acquired and
misused its monopoly power in a particular sport, thereby preventing the entrance of
competitor leagues and preventing meaningful competition within the market for profes-
sional sports. See Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 759 (cited in note 14). See, for exam-
ple, United States Football League v National Football League, 644 F Supp 1040 (S D NY
1986); American Football League v National Football League, 323 F2d 124 (4th Cir 1963).
41 Some commentators have argued that sports leagues are single entities and there-
fore incapable of conspiring in violation of § 1. See generally, Lee Goldman, Sports, Anti-
trust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 Tul L Rev 751, 761-89 (describing the views of the
major commentators in the single entity debate). Despite its attractiveness, courts and
other scholars have largely rejected that theory. See Jacobs, 67 Ind L J at 58 n 10 (cited in
note 24). See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v National Football
League, 726 F2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir 1984) (rejecting single entity defense); North
American Soccer League v National Football League, 670 F2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir 1982)
(same).
42 See, for example, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v National Football
League, 726 F2d 1381, 1401 (9th Cir 1984) ("Raiders") ("The NFL is an unique business
organization to which it is difficult to apply antitrust rules which were developed in the
context of arrangements between actual competitors."); Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at
760 (cited in note 14) ("[Tlhe operation of professional sports is a highly unique organiza-
tional process that is not easily adaptable to traditional forms of Sherman Act enforce-
ment."); Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports, The Rule of Rea-
son, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S Cal L Rev 943, 946-7 (1988) ("Because
organizationally a sports league is not entirely analogous to any other type of enterprise,
legal doctrines created and developed in more traditional business contexts do not easily
or always correctly apply to league rules and conduct.").
43 See note 15 and accompanying text.
44 See National Collegiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of University of
Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 101 (1984) ("NCAA"). See also John C. Weistart, League Control of
Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Cooperation in the Sports Indus-
try, 1984 Duke L J 1013, 1017 n 11 (1984) (asserting that in NCAA, "the Court ... cre-
ate[d] an industry-wide rule that removes the activities of sports associations and leagues
from the purview of the summary per se approach"); Daniel B. Rubanowitz, Who Said
"There's No Place Like Home?". Franchise Relocation in Professional Sports, 10 Loyola
Enter L J 163, 178 (1990) (discussing the extension of NCAA to professional sports
leagues).
45 See Rubanowitz, 10 Loyola Ent L J at 175 (cited in note 44).
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business contexts, in which each company's success comes at the
expense of competitor companies.46
For sports leagues, the demise of a single franchise may be
disastrous to the entire league since the quality of the league as a
whole depends on the quality of the component teams. Thus,
teams engage in a joint effort to promote the strength of individ-
ual teams and the league as a whole.47 Various organizational
structures, such as revenue-sharing provisions, and salary and
payroll caps, aim to maximize revenue as well as fan interest,
thereby ensuring the league's viability.48
B. Relevant Market Definition
Sports leagues operate in a variety of markets, such as those
for stadia and for television and radio broadcast.49 These markets
are composed of separate and distinct league products, each
having its own distinct consumers. ° Despite this complexity,
courts have given insufficient attention to determining exactly
what products sports leagues produce.5
46 See Drew D. Krause, The National Football League's Ban On Corporate Ownership:
Violating Antitrust To Preserve Traditional Ownership-Implications Arising From Wil-
liam H. Sullivan's Antitrust Suit, 2 Seton Hall J Sport L 175, 177 (1992).
47 Id at 178. See also Mid-South Grizzlies v National Football League, 550 F Supp
558, 566 (E D Pa 1982) ("If all the teams [in a league] should compete as hard as they can
in a business way, the stronger teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones into finan-
cial failure. If this should happen not only would the weaker teams fail, but eventually the
whole league... would fail."); Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The
Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L Rev
219, 262 (1984) ("[Elach club wants every other club to be economically successful, and no
rational club wants any other to be economically injured because such injury will to some
extent diminish the quality of the league product as a whole.").
48 See Heintel, 46 Case W Res L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 23). One of the best exam-
ples of cooperation within a sports league is the substantial amount of revenue sharing
that occurs. The NFL member clubs, for example, share approximately 90 percent of the
total revenues earned by the NFL and its teams. VKK Corp v NFL, 1999 WL 432558, *3
(S D NY). When gate revenues are shared it is in all teams' best interest for all teams to
be strong competitors, thereby increasing ticket sales. Furthermore, the quality and mar-
ketability of the league as a whole depends on each team's financial and social status.
Goldman, 63 Tul L Rev at 757-58 (cited in note 41).
49 See Ross, 73 Minn L Rev at 647 (cited in note 3); Roberts, 61 S Cal L Rev at 960-61
(cited in note 42) ("NFL football is in fact marketed through two primary mediums, each of
which is more rationally considered separately for antitrust analysis.").
50 See Piazza v Major League Baseball, 831 F Supp 420, 439-40 (E D Pa 1993) (recog-
nizing that the consumers in the product market for the business of baseball are fans and,
perhaps, the broadcast industry, while the consumers in the product market for existing
professional sports teams are "those who would like to become team owners").
51 Heintel, 46 Case W Res L Rev at 1046 (cited in note 23) ("Although [courts] have
dealt extensively with the question of what output market for the product is appropriate,
they have not defined exactly what the product is.").
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Some of the products that courts and commentators have
identified as outputs of sports leagues include games,52 champi-
onship seasons," shares in National Football League ("NFL")
teams,54 and sports franchises.55 While sports leagues may pro-
duce all of these goods, not all will be relevant in a sports fran-
chise relocation case.56 If a court focuses upon the wrong relevant
product market, its antitrust analysis will be skewed and it will
fail to accurately assess the competitive effects of the practice in
question.57 Therefore, it is especially important in the sports con-
text to ensure that the relevant market definition accords with
the particular antitrust allegation at issue.5"
C. Identifying the Problem: Franchise Relocation
Restraints and § 1
All professional sports leagues have rules, commonly known
as franchise relocation restrictions, which restrict owners' ability
to move their franchises from their home territories to other loca-
tions.59 Generally, these restrictions prohibit individual teams
from moving to a different home site without the prior approval of
52 See North American Soccer League v National Football League, 670 F2d 1249, 1251
(2nd Cir 1982) (identifying the NFL's business as "providing public entertainment in the
form of competitive football games"); Jacobs, 67 Ind L J at 54 n 126 (cited in note 24) (de-
fining the NFL's product as individual games).
53 See Raiders, 726 F2d at 1393 (calling the Super Bowl "the ultimate NFL product");
Roberts, 61 S Cal L Rev at 985 (cited in note 42) ("Using the NFL as the example, the
relevant product is NFL football.., a single game.., is not a separate product for mean-
ingful economic purposes. The product is the league's annual series of 224 regular season
games leading to a post-season playoff tournament and ultimately a Super Bowl cham-
pion.").
54 See Sullivan v National Football League, 34 F3d 1091, 1101 (1st Cir 1994).
55 See Piazza, 831 F Supp at 430. See also note 50.
56 Thomas Kennedy, Comment, Will America's Pastime Be a Part of America's Fu-
ture?: An Antitrust Analysis That Enables Sports Leagues to Compete Effectively in the
Entertainment Market, 46 UCLA L Rev 577, 599 (1998) ("Sports leagues compete in multi-
ple relevant markets depending upon the particular endeavor.").
57 See Carvill, 566 PLIiPat at 67 (cited in note 25) ("[Imn almost all antitrust cases, the
decision as to whether certain conduct violates the law or not turns in large part on the
definition of the market(s) in which the conduct occurs and the effect of that conduct on
competition within the market(s).").
58 For the importance of tailored market definitions, see notes 34-38 and accompa-
nying text.
59 See, for example, NFL Const & By-Laws, Art IV, § 4.3 (requiring 75 percent vote
before member can "transfer its franchise or playing site to a different city, either within
or outside its home territory"). The NFL defines "Home Territory" as "The city in which [a]
club is located and for which it holds a franchise and plays its home games, and includes
the surrounding territory to the extent of 75 miles in every direction from the exterior
corporate limits of such city." Id at § 4.1.
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a specified percentage of league members. ° While restricting
owners' ability to move their teams, relocation restrictions simul-
taneously protect each owner's home territory from encroachment
by another team."
Opponents of franchise relocation restraints argue that the
restraints "perpetuate exclusive territories" in violation of the
Sherman Act.2 On this view, exclusivity "insulates teams from
direct competition with each other and facilitates the establish-
ment of monopoly prices to the detriment of the consuming pub-
lic." 3 For precisely these reasons, the Ninth Circuit invalidated
the NFL's use of its relocation restraint to prevent the Oakland
Raiders from moving to Los Angeles, the home territory of the
(then) Los Angeles Rams. 4
Sports leagues contend that exclusive territories are neces-
sary to promote stability and to protect member teams' chances of
survival. 5 The NFL, for example, concedes that the purpose of its
relocation restriction is to restrain competition among member
teams.66 However, the NFL justifies the restriction as serving
other legitimate, procompetitive league needs, such as main-
taining fan loyalty.6
60 Lazaroff, 53 Fordham L Rev at 160 (cited in note 16). See, for example, NBA Const
§ 9(a) (amending § 9 of the National Basketball Association ("NBA") Constitution, which
gave a league member the right to prevent a transfer to its home territory, to require
majority vote for franchise move after consideration of various objective factors).
61 The NFL's restrictions effectively grant each team an exclusive right to NFL foot-
ball within a seventy-five-mile radius of the home field of the team. Quirk and Fort, Pay
Dirt at 300 (cited in note 3). See also Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 118 (cited in note 3)
("Under rules that apply in all leagues, no league team can schedule a game in the terri-
tory of another league team without obtaining permission from that team.").
62 Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v National Football League, 726 F2d
1381, 1395 (9th Cir 1984) ("Raiders"). See also Frank P. Scibilia, Baseball Franchise Sta-
bility and Consumer Welfare: An Argument for Reaffirming Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
with Regard to Its Franchise Relocation Rules, 6 Seton Hall J Sports L 409, 434-35 (1996)
("Baseball's franchise relocation restrictions can be viewed as agreements to divide mar-
kets, and as such, may be considered horizontal restraints among direct competitors.").
63 Raiders, 726 F2d at 1395.
64 See id ("The harm from Rule 4.3 [the NFL's franchise relocation restriction] is espe-
cially acute in this case because it prevents a move by a team into another existing team's
market. If the transfer is upheld, direct competition between the Rams and Raiders would
presumably ensue to the benefit of all who consume the NFL product in the Los Angeles
area."). The Court's decision did not render franchise relocation restrictions invalid as a
matter of law. See National Basketball Association v SDC Basketball Club, Inc, 815 F2d
562, 567-68 (9th Cir 1987).
65 See Amoroso, 17 Rutgers L J at 303-04 (cited in note 2).
66 See Raiders, 726 F2d at 1395.
67 Id. See also Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 119 (cited in note 3) ("Supporters of the
leagues argue that [franchise relocation] rules provide the strongest incentives for owners
to invest in their teams and to develop fan loyalty within their home cities, while protect-
ing fans from capricious franchise moves.").
SPORTS FRANCHISE RELOCATION
A related justification for relocation restrictions is the fear
that a particular franchise's relocation may "damag[e] the entire
league product."68 Under this theory, fans in an abandoned city
will likely harbor hostility toward the entire league, possibly
leading to a decrease in television ratings. 9 When the Ninth Cir-
cuit evaluated the NFL's relocation restraint as applied to the
Oakland Raiders, it recognized in dicta the League's need to
"have some control over the placement of teams to ensure NFL
football is popular in a diverse group of markets." ° Nonetheless,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict against the NFL,
noting that the League could have achieved that end through
other, less restrictive methods. 1
While the precise effects of franchise relocation restrictions
are debatable, it is clear that they differ depending upon the
market examined. For example, if the relevant product market is
defined to include all entertainment products, such that the
sports league is competing for fans with other forms of enter-
tainment, the defendant league may properly assert the alleged
quality-enhancing benefits of franchise relocation restraints. En-
suring the viability of franchise locations and home ticket sales is
arguably an essential part of bolstering league standings vis-a-vis
other entertainment products available to consumers.72 On the
other hand, if the market is defined more narrowly, perhaps as
NFL football only, then these procompetitive benefits disappear,
68 Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 763-64 (cited in note 14).
69 Id. See also, Michele Cotrupe Curbing Franchise Free Agency: The Professional
Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998, 9 DePaul-LCA J Art & Enter L 165, 165 (1998)
(arguing that recent moves have "separated fans from their National Football League
home teams, destroying natural team rivalries and creating fan animosity and distrust
towards the League and the individual teams' owners"). But see Lazaroff, 53 Fordham L
Rev at 214 (cited in note 16) (suggesting that while some fans may be devastated by a
franchise's departure, "[i]t is not inconceivable that fans in the city losing a team will
continue to follow that club").
70 Raiders, 726 F2d at 1396. One recent study gives credence to the major sports
leagues' arguments in defense of franchise relocation rules generally and to the NFL's
defense in Raiders specifically. See Kenneth Lehn and Michael Sykuta, Antitrust and
Franchise Relocation in Professional Sports: An Economic Analysis of the Raiders Case, 42
Antitrust Bull 541, 545-63 (1997). The authors' argument relies heavily on two facts:
(1) the Los Angeles area does not currently have a football team; and (2) the Rams suf-
fered in Los Angeles while the San Francisco 49ers prospered after the Raiders left the
Bay area. Id at 543.
71 See Raiders, 726 F2d at 1396. The court noted that the "possibility of less restric-
tive alternatives" is a pertinent factor in determining the reasonableness of a particular
restraint in all rule of reason cases. Id, quoting National Football League v North Ameri-
can Soccer League, 495 US 1074, 1080 (1982) (Rehnquist, dissenting).
72 See Kennedy, 46 UCLA L Rev at 610 (cited in note 56) ("Teams must be able to
reach horizontal agreements for the league ... to compete in the entertainment market.").
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since the NFL has no competition in that market. v3 Because of its
profound effects on the scope of defenses available to the defen-
dant league, relevant product market definition may be disposi-
tive in any given sports franchise relocation case.
III. RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION IN
THE SPORTS INDUSTRY
Participants in the franchise relocation debate tend to advo-
cate one of three product market definitions: (1) the single-sport
market, (2) the entertainment market, or (3) the market for
sports franchises.74 Examining these market definitions in detail
helps clarify their contours and their impact on any given fran-
chise relocation case.
A. The Market for the Particular Sport at Issue
The market definition that appears most frequently within
sports-related case law is the market for the particular sport at
issue-the "single-sport market."75 This market definition ap-.
pears in franchise relocation cases and in commentary regarding
relocation restrictions.76 Commentators characterize this market
73 See Lazaroff, 53 Fordham L Rev at 211 (cited in note 16) ("[If the market definition
is narrow enough to include, for example, only professional football, with whom is the NFL
competing?").
74 There is also a possible fourth relevant product market consisting of all professional
sports leagues. Indeed, one commentator has recognized a high degree of competition
among professional sports leagues. Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 789-90 (cited in
note 13) ("Perhaps the real competition that exists among sports leagues is ... that which
requires the selling of professional sports to the consumer."). This Comment, however,
considers this market subsumed by the entertainment market. See notes 85-94 and ac-
companying text.
75 See, for example, Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585, 596
n 20 (1985) (finding separate submarket for downhill skiing at destination ski resorts);
National Collegiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468
US 85, 111 (1984) (finding that "intercollegiate football telecasts generate an audience
uniquely attractive to advertisers"); International Boxing Club v United States, 358 US
242, 249-51 (1959) (finding separate market for championship boxing); Fishman v Wirtz,
1981-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 64,378 at 74,762-74 (N D Ill 1981) (finding separate market
for NBA basketball in case arising out of attempted acquisition of professional basketball
team), affd in relevant part, 807 F2d 520 (7th Cir 1986); Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
Inc v Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc, 351 F Supp 462, 501-02 (E D Pa 1972) (finding sepa-
rate market for amateur professional hockey).
76 Most commentators agree that the jury instructions in Los Angeles Coliseum Com-
mission v National Football League, 468 F Supp 154 (C D Cal 1979), affd 726 F2d 1381
(9th Cir 1984) ("Raiders"), allowed and encouraged the jury to find that the product of
NFL football constituted an isolated relevant product market. See Roberts, 61 S Cal L Rev
at 960-65 (cited in note 42) (criticizing district court's jury instruction and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's affirmance). The Ninth Circuit's determination that NFL football has "limited sub-
stitutes from a consumer standpoint" was based on several factors. Raiders, 726 F2d at
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definition as "narrow" in contrast to "broad" market definitions,
such as the market for all entertainment products."
Proponents of the single-sport market definition maintain
that there are no reasonably interchangeable substitutes, for ex-
ample, for professional football games on Sundays.78 In a case in-
volving the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), the district
court for the Northern District of Illinois approved of the single-
sport market definition:
The presentation of professional basketball exhibitions...
does not directly compete with any other product or serv-
ice. It is a form of entertainment which is unique in the
eyes of the consumer and is without any close substitute.
It has its own fans for whom other products and services
are not reasonably interchangeable. Furthermore, the de-
mand for professional basketball is not effected [sic] by the
existence of other amateur or professional sports or other
forms of entertainment.79
Such a narrow market definition is controversial because it is
disadvantageous to defendant leagues.0 When the relevant mar-
ket is defined as NFL football, for example, a court will likely find
that the NFL has monopoly power in that market."s Even if a case
does not involve a § 2 claim, a showing of substantial market
power in the relevant market places the defendant at a disadvan-
1393. First, the court noted that the Raiders had consistently sold out the Oakland Coli-
seum despite the fact that Raiders' ticket prices were among the highest in the League. Id.
The court further acknowledged the NFL's "extraordinary number of television viewers"
and its "importance to the television networks." Id.
77 See, for example, Jacobs, 67 Ind L J at 58 n 128 (cited in note 24) (comparing the
narrow and broad definitions and the implications of each).
78 Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 784 (cited in note 14). See also Piraino, 57 Ohio
St L J at 1693-94 (cited in note 3) ("The fans of each [major professional] sport do not view
other forms of entertainment as reasonable substitutes. Fans generally have not switched
their allegiance from one professional sport to another when their favorite sport has raised
ticket prices, suffered a strike, or experienced other difficulties."); Daniel E. Lazaroff,
Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues: Re-examining the Threshold Questions, 20 Ariz St
L J 953, 977-78 (1988) ("[I]t does not appear that sports fans respond to ticket price in-
creases or decreases in a manner that suggests cross-elasticity of demand between one
sport and another or between sports and other forms of entertainment.").
79 Fishman, 1981-2 Trade Cases (CCH) at 74,741, 74,756.
80 See, for example, Lazaroff, 53 Fordham L Rev at 215 (cited in note 16) ("It appears
that only if broader market definitions are accepted and if the restraints are more care-
fully tailored can a relocation restriction possibly survive a section 1 challenge."); Jacobs,
67 Ind L J at 58 n 128 (cited in note 24) ("The narrow approach to market definition obvi-
ously makes it more difficult for the leagues' practices to pass antitrust muster.").
81 See Lazaroff, 53 Fordham L Rev at 211 (cited in note 16) (concluding that the NFL
is the only competitor in the market for professional football).
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tage.s2 A defendant with substantial market power, approaching
monopoly power, will have difficulty showing that a restraint's
procompetitive benefits outweigh its anticompetitive effects.83
Thus, league defenders reject the use of the narrow market defi-
nition, because courts are more likely to strike down league re-
straints under this approach.84
B. The Entertainment Market
Defining the relevant product market as "the entertainment
market" is popular with commentators who support sports
leagues' freedom to impose internal restraints upon their mem-
bers.85 In contrast to supporters of the single-sport market, pro-
ponents of the entertainment market definition contend that
other entertainment products are adequate substitutes for pro-
fessional sports leagues' products. 6 As Chief Justice Rehnquist
has argued, "[tihe NFL owners are joint venturers who produce a
product, professional football, which competes with other sports
and other forms of entertainment in the entertainment market.
Although individual NFL teams compete with one another on the
playing field, they rarely compete in the market place." 7
Without reliable empirical data, it is difficult to know the ex-
tent of cross-elasticity between a particular league's product and
other entertainment products.88 Defenders of single-sport market
82 See Lazaroff, 20 Ariz St L J at 972-73 (cited in note 78) ("[Tjhe presence of signifi-
cant market power and the absence of enough interbrand competition to offset or check
the anticompetitive consequences of a restraint may well result in a finding of illegality.").
83 J.O. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 6E.05[2] at 6E-42
("[T]o the extent a major manufacturer's market share approaches dominance in the prod-
uct market, the opportunity for procompetitive effects of a distributive restraint in the
interbrand sector is diminished.").
84 See Scibilia, 6 Seton Hall J Sports L at 439-40 (cited in note 62) ("If the narrow
market definition is used, and it probably would be, [the] pro-competitive effects [of reloca-
tion restraints] ... will not be attributed to the relocation restraint at all. The pro-
competitive side of the balancing scale will be practically empty.").
85 See, for example, Kennedy, 46 UCLA L Rev at 599 (cited in note 56) (arguing that
sports leagues' primary market "is the entertainment market because a league's failure to
compete effectively in this market renders its ability to compete in secondary markets
impossible.").
86 See, for example, Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 748 (cited in note 14)
("[Pirofessional sports leagues may in fact face a glut of competition from alternative
forms of entertainment."). But see Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 116 (cited in note 3) (ac-
knowledging that teams' monopoly power is limited by the availability of substitutes such
as the college game, other pro sports, and alternative forms of entertainment, but con-
cluding that teams have significant local monopoly power nonetheless).
87 495 US 1074, 1077 (1982) (Rehnquist dissenting).
88 See Roberts, 32 UCLA L Rev at 258 n 135 (cited in note 47) ("To date, no court or
commentator has made any effort to engage in such [empirical] analysis for any league.
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definitions argue that avid football fans do not acknowledge any
substitutes for NFL football games. 9 In contrast, supporters of
the entertainment market definition refuse to attribute such un-
dying loyalty to professional sports fans.9" On the latter view, the
proper approach is to consider the preferences of ordinary con-
sumers who, "realizing the limitations of both financial resources
and time within which to enjoy those precious moments of lei-
sure, are much more open minded about the availability of the
various entertainment attractions from which to choose.9 1 Few of
these consumers, according to this view, are "so parochial in
[their] tastes as to insist upon only one form of leisure activity to
the exclusion of all others."92
Using the entertainment market as the relevant product
market allows defendant leagues to describe their own market
power in reference to a larger group of products. Since the market
itself is larger and contains more products, any one participant's
Rather, they seem to have been content to assert, without any reasoned justification,
conclusions that merely support whatever point they are trying to prove."); Heintel, 46
Case W Res L Rev at 1046 (cited in note 23) (summarizing competing market definitions
and concluding that "[n]one of the market definitions were based on any study of the
league's competition in the eyes of consumers. In no case has a court defined a product
market and then stated that a sports league makes up a specific percentage of that mar-
ket.").
89 See note 78 and accompanying text. See also Lazaroff, 53 Fordham L Rev at 209
(cited in note 16) (doubting whether a 20 percent increase in ticket prices would result in
NFL fan defections to other sports or other entertainment products). But see Grauer, 82
Mich L Rev at 34 n 156 (cited in note 20) (arguing that the relevant product market for the
NFL is the "entertainment" market because a decrease in quality or an increase in price
would cause some fans to "turn to another form of entertainment, whether that be college
football, professional basketball, John Wayne westerns, classical music, or something
else").
90 See Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 800 n 285 (cited in note 14) ("The point is
that in defining the relevant product market for professional sports, courts and some
commentators have incorrectly attributed too much significance to the loyalties of sports
fanatics while ignoring the buying habits of the casual purchaser of entertainment.");
Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 Tl L Rev 562, 564 n 8 (1986) ("To suggest that the
NFL, let alone less popular leagues like the [NHLI or the [NBA], have [sic] succeeded so
completely in establishing product differentiation that they have no meaningful competi-
tion for the leisure time and dollars of consumers regardless of the price charged or the
quality of the entertainment product produced is not justifiable, notwithstanding that
there may be a core of fanatics who, within limits, would watch that sport under any cir-
cumstances before doing anything else.").
91 Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 822 n 285 (cited in note 14).
92 Id. See also, Roberts, 60 Tul L Rev at 564 n 8 (cited in note 90) (arguing that a 10
percent drop in NFL games' television ratings in the three seasons prior to 1985 indicates
that "consumers of NFL football must consider something to be a substitute"). But see
Lazaroff, 53 Fordham L Rev at 209 (cited in note 16) ("[Dloes anyone really contend that a
season ticketholder of the Los Angeles Raiders would accept a showing of Heidi as a rea-
sonable substitute?").
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market share is necessarily smaller than it would be under a sin-
gle-sport market definition.93 Reduced market power and the
presence of substantial competition in the entertainment market
would arguably justify internal league restraints. Such restraints
would then enhance the league's ability to compete for fans in the
entertainment market. 4
C. The Market for Sports Franchises
The "market for sports franchises" is the least discussed of the
three relevant product market definitions, although a handful of
courts and commentators have accepted it.95 While most of these
courts were analyzing other team ownership rules,96 at least one
93 Lazaroff, 20 Ariz St L J at 975 (cited in note 78) (concluding that the anticompeti-
tive effect of a league's restraint is de minimis if the market is defined broadly as the
entertainment market).
94 See Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 748-49 (cited in note 14) ("In light of the
intensity of competition within which sports leagues compete, courts should sustain most
league devices aimed at enhancing the quality of the product."). See also Roberts, 60 Tul L
Rev at 564-65 n 8 (cited in note 90) ('Whatever injury to consumer welfare may result
from league relocation of rivalry among the member clubs, assuming there is any, there
may very well be a more than offsetting benefit to consumers from the increased efficiency
of the league in producing its product."). This view depends upon a rule-of-reason analysis
that balances procompetitive effects in one market against anticompetitive effects in other
markets. See Continental TV, Inc v GTE Sylvania, Inc, 433 US 36, 51-55 (1977) (adopting
inter/intrabrand balancing for nonprice vertical restraints).
95 See Sullivan v National Football League, 34 F3d 1091, 1097 (1st Cir 1994) (noting
jury's finding that the relevant market was the "nationwide market for the sale and pur-
chase of ownership interests in the National Football League member clubs, in general,
and in the New England Patriots, in particular"); Sullivan v Tagliabue, 25 F3d 43, 49 (1st
Cir 1994) (finding that the "market for professional football teams" was "the direct victim
of the alleged antitrust violation" where the plaintiff challenged the NFL's rule prohibit-
ing sale of shares in a league franchise to any company not engaged in business of profes-
sional football); Murray v National Football League, 1996 WL 363911, *24 (E D Pa) ac-
cepting plaintiffs' definition of the "market for the sale and purchase of ownership and
control interests in NFL professional football franchises" for purposes of motion to dis-
miss); Piazza v Major League Baseball, 831 F Supp 420, 430 (E D Pa 1993) (finding rele-
vant product market of "the market for ownership of professional baseball teams, and the
market for ownership of the Giants in particular"); Fishman v Estate of Wirtz, 807 F2d
520, 532 n 9 (7th Cir 1986) (recognizing the potential for competition in the market for
ownership of teams); National American Soccer League v National Football League, 670
F2d 1249, 1260-61 (2d Cir 1982) ("NASL") (finding market for "sports ownership capital
and skill"). See also Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at 1729 n 29 (cited in note 3) (concluding that
the market for the purchase and sale of sports franchises "should be deemed a separate
relevant market for antitrust purposes"); Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 23-87 (cited in note
3). But see Roberts, 32 UCLA L Rev at 301 n 249 (cited in note 47) (criticizing the sports
capital market found in NASL as "contrived" and not reflective of the consumer interests
at stake).
96 See Murray, 1996 WL 363911 at *23 (calling into question the NFL's public fi-
nancing policy); Sullivan v National Football League, 34 F3d 1091, 1095 (1st Cir 1994)
(calling into question NFL's uncodified policy against the sale of ownership interests in an
NFL franchise to the public through offerings of publicly traded stock); NASL, 670 F2d at
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court adopted the definition in a sports franchise relocation
case.
97
1. The contours of the market for sports franchises.
According to the sports franchise market definition, sports
franchises constitute a league product98 and individuals or groups
compete to purchase those franchises. 99 Indeed, a professional
sports franchise is an asset that generates a cash flow for the
owner through profits from the regular season schedule of games
and from playoffs.' ° Moreover, courts and commentators have
found that current team owners compete to maximize the value of
their franchises in the market for sports franchises.1"'
Many potential investors consider owning a professional
sports team to be a rare and attractive opportunity. The soaring
values and scarce supply of professional sports franchises1 2 fur-
ther increases demand among a distinct group of potential buy-
1250 (invalidating NFL ban on cross-ownership by NFL members of other major profes-
sional sports league teams).
97 See Piazza, 831 F Supp at 430. For discussion of Piazza, see notes 108-14 and
accompanying text.
98 Compare Sullivan, 34 F3d at 1101 (acknowledging that the NFL's public ownership
policy "restricts the output of a product-a share in a NFL team").
99 The number of franchise sales in each of the major professional sports leagues
reveals a robust market for sports franchises. There were fifty-six franchise sales in MLB
from 1901-1990; fifty-eight franchise sales in the NBA from 1946-1990; forty-five fran-
chise sales in the NFL from 1920-1990; and fifty franchise sales in the NHL from 1917-
1990. Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 23-38 (cited in note 3).
100 Id at 49.
101 See, for example, Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at 1725 (cited in note 3); Sullivan, 34 F3d
at 1100 (finding that "teams face competitive pressure in selling their ownership interests
generally to whoever might buy them" and that "greater access to capital for all teams will
put increased pressure on some teams to compete with others for that capital"); Murray v
National Football League, 1996 WL 363911, *23-24 (E D Pa) (citing plaintiff's allegations
that NFL's public financing policy "protect[s] present owners from competing with large
conglomerates of corporate or public financiers," "eliminate[s] competition by depriving
competitors [of] the use of ordinary methods of financing," "eliminate[s] competitors with
access to public financing and other sources of investment capital," and "reduce[s] the
availability of ownership interests in NFL professional football franchises" sufficient to
withstand motion to dismiss).
102 "Since 1990, the average sports franchise's purchase price has risen roughly 13
percent a year." Paul Farhi, Franchises Don't Come Cheap, But Values Climb, Seattle
Times D7 (Jan 24, 1999). See also, Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 23-87 (cited in note 3)
(discussing the vast increases in franchise values and presenting relevant data on the
franchise market); Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at 1698 (cited in note 3) ("By keeping the sup-
ply of franchises artificially low... [tihe owners are guaranteed that, whenever a team is
for sale, several potential buyers will drive up the price by competing for the rare oppor-
tunity to own a sports franchise.").
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ers. °3 Depending upon the specifics of the transaction, there
might be several potential buyers competing for the same fran-
chise, whether it is an existing or expansion team.
°4
The precise boundaries of the sports franchise market in any
given case are fact specific. Absent a factual context, it is hard to
determine, for example, whether an investor or group of investors
would consider a NFL franchise to be an adequate substitute for
a NBA franchise. Nevertheless, at least one court has concluded
that the market for investment capital in sports franchises is dis-
tinct from the general business capital market."5 According to the
Second Circuit, the "interdependence of professional sports
league members and the unique nature of their business" are
such that "the market for and availability of capital investment is
limited."' 6 Therefore, it is likely that potential investors do not
necessarily consider other capital investments to be adequate
substitutes for sports franchise ownership. If this is true, then
the market need not be defined broadly enough to include all
other investment opportunities.
The geographic market definition is also highly sensitive be-
cause some investment groups may only be willing to purchase a
team in a particular area or to purchase a team and relocate it.'
Thus, how to define the relevant product market will be a ques-
tion of fact for the jury.
103 North American Soccer League v National Football League, 670 F2d 1249, 1253 (2d
Cir 1982) ("NASL") (finding that the conditions of sports ownership "have tended to at-
tract individuals or businesses with distinct characteristics as distinguished from the
much larger number of financiers of the type prevailing in most business markets").
104 See, for example, Piazza v Major League Baseball, 831 F Supp 420, 430 (E D Pa
1993) ("Plaintiffs aver that they were competing in the team franchise market with other
potential investors located primarily outside of Major League Baseball for ownership of
the Giants").
105 See NASL, 670 F2d at 1253.
106 Id (citing the risk of investing in a league, the need for reasonable compatibility
with other members of the league, the need for sufficient understanding of the business,
and the need for interdependence of ownership as support for finding that capital is not
fungible in the business of producing major league professional sports).
107 See, for example, Piazza, 831 F Supp at 430, 439 n 25 (suggesting that where plain-
tiffs sought to purchase and relocate the San Francisco Giants, the relevant product mar-
ket was the market for ownership of professional baseball teams in general and ownership
of the Giants in particular, or even "the market for the purchase and transfer of the Gi-
ants only"); New Orleans Pelican§ Baseball, Inc v National Association of Professional
Baseball Leagues, Inc, 1994 WL 631144, *1-3 (E D La) (reviewing unsuccessful attempt of
Pelicans to purchase the AA Southern League's Charlotte franchise and relocate the club
to New Orleans). But see Scibilia, 6 Seton Hall J Sports L at 464 (cited in note 62) ("[Mlost
proposed franchise moves do not involve changes in ownership.").
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2. Piazza v Major League Baseball.
In Piazza v Major League Baseball,"8 the District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania adopted the sports franchise
market definition."°9 The plaintiffs in Piazza were members of an
investment group organized to acquire the San Francisco Giants
baseball club and relocate it to Tampa Bay, Florida."' Despite
having signed a letter of intent with the Giants' owner, the plain-
tiffs' application to purchase and relocate the Giants was re-
jected, allegedly through improper action by the defendant, Major
League Baseball ("MLB")."' The thwarted purchase attempt re-
sulted in an antitrust suit in which the plaintiffs identified the
relevant product market as the "market for existing American
League and National League baseball teams.""'
The district court defined "the market for ownership of ex-
isting major league professional baseball teams" as having the
following components: "(1) the product being sold is an ownership
interest in professional baseball teams; (2) the sellers are team
owners; and (3) the buyers are those who would like to become
team owners.""' The court found this market relevant for the
purpose of analyzing the anticompetitive effects of league govern-
ance rules and practices because "if the team owners combined,
they could increase the price of teams considerably and control
the conditions of sale.' 14
It is not entirely clear how other sports franchise relocation
cases would have been decided had the market been defined as
the market for sports franchises. In similar cases involving the
market for sports franchises or a variation thereof, courts invali-
dated or at least called into doubt the sports league's restraint."'
This is understandable given that a professional sports league
exercises significant market power in the market for sports fran-
lO8 831 F Supp 420 (E D Pa 1993).
109 Id at 429-31.
110 Id at 421.
111 Id.
112 Piazza, 831 F Supp at 430.
113 Id at 439.
114 Id.
115 See Sullivan v National Football League, 34 F3d 1091, 1098-1103 (1st Cir 1994)
(questioning NFL's policy against public ownership of franchises); North American Soccer
League v National Football League, 670 F2d 1249, 1261 (2d Cir 1982) ("NASL") (invali-
dating NFL's ban on cross-ownership); Murray v National Football League, 1996 WL
363911, *23 (E D Pa) (questioning NFL's public financing policy).
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chises."' Increased market power, in turn, makes it more difficult
for the defendant to demonstrate procompetitive effects flowing
from a particular restraint."7
IV. THE MARKET FOR EXISTING FRANCHISES IS THE APPROPRIATE
MARKET IN A SPORTS FRANCHISE RELOCATION CASE
No product market definition has prevailed as the appropri-
ate market definition for franchise relocation cases. Courts' in-
ability to consistently identify sports leagues' output and product
market has resulted in legal uncertainty for sports leagues." 8 Re-
solving this debate in favor of one of the proposed relevant prod-
uct markets will ensure that all parties involved in future sports
antitrust litigation have a fair chance to demonstrate the alleged
effects of franchise relocation restraints.
A. Effects of Franchise Relocation Restrictions on the
Market for Sports Franchises
Sports franchise relocation restrictions raise antitrust con-
cerns due to their potential anticompetitive effects. Most courts
and commentators have focused upon harms to fans flowing from
these alleged anticompetitive effects." 9 However, these restric-
tions also distort the price and availability of franchises and di-
minish competition for existing franchises. Given that the rele-
vant product market definition must be narrowly tailored to the
particular antitrust violation alleged, 2 ° an allegation of harm to
franchise prices, value, and availability should be analyzed in the
context of the market for sports franchises.
Franchise relocation restraints resemble refusals to deal,
which, outside of the sports industry, are generally considered
116 But see Roberts, 61 S Cal L Rev at 1016 n 253 (cited in note 42) ("[B]eing the sole
producer of a particular sports entertainment product does not necessarily mean that the
league possesses substantial or monopoly power in a relevant product market.").
117 See Sullivan, 34 F3d at 1097 (stating that given the jury's finding of a "market for
ownership interests in NFL teams," "the NFL faces an uphill battle in its attack on the
presence of an injury to competition").
118 See Heintel, 46 Case W Res L Rev at 1048-49 (cited in note 23) ("Inability to define
the product of sports leagues such as the NFL has prevented courts from reaching a con-
sensus in defining the appropriate output market of the NFL.").
119 See, for example, Scibilia, 6 Seton Hall J Sports L at 441, 443 (cited in note 62)
(arguing that franchise relocation restrictions do not result in an increase in the price
consumers pay to watch major league baseball and that franchise relocation rules do not
result in a decrease in the output of major league baseball).
120 See notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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illegal per se. 12 This type of refusal to deal is narrow, consisting
of refusing to deal with owners or potential investors who seek to
relocate a team to an existing franchise's territory-that is, to a
"protected" area. Exclusive territory provisions in the major
sports leagues' constitutions and by-laws establish these pro-
122 thtected areas. Given the significance of location in modern sports
leagues, protecting current owners from intra-league competition
in their home locations is especially pernicious.'23
1. The economics of location.
In modern sports leagues, location is everything-at least ac-
cording to economists. While many variables affect a team's suc-
cess or failure, economists most often focus on location.124 Eco-
nomic models, observations of league standings, team perform-
ance, and profitability over time reveal the importance of team
location.'
Early studies indicate that team quality is dependent upon
quality of location,'26 because each location's unique attributes,
such as income and population, affect revenue-generating ability
and thus the profit potential of any team located there. Econo-
mists have noted that teams in big cities win more champion-
121 See Antitrust Law Developments at 115 (cited in note 13). See also Rosenbaum, 41
U Miami L Rev at 779-80 (cited in note 14) ("Although certain league practices tread
dangerously close to some of the unlawful characteristics common among group boycotts
or concerted refusals to deal, courts have determined that the economic realities inherent
in the business of professional sports leagues nonetheless result in a preference for rule of
reason scrutiny and not per se invalidity.").
122 See notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
123 The NFL has attempted to protect its member teams from inter-league competition
as well. In North American Soccer League v National Football League, 670 F2d 1249 (2d
Cir 1982), the Second Circuit invalidated the NFL's ban on ownership by NFL members of
other major professional sports league teams because it found evidence of protectionism.
Id at 1250. See also id at 1257 ("[The cross-ownership ban's] objective also is to shield
certain individual NFL member teams as discrete economic entities from competition in
their respective home territories on the part of individual NASL teams that are gaining
economic strength in those localities.").
124 See generally J.C.H. Jones and D.G. Gerguson, Location and Survivial in the Na-
tional Hockey League, 36 J Indus Econ 443 (1988); James Quirk, An Economic Analysis of
Team Movements in Professional Sports, 38 Law & Contemp Probs 42 (1973).
125 See Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 173 (cited in note 3) ("Competitive balance con-
tinues to be a problem because leagues protect the franchise rights of the richer teams,
those located in the megalopolis cities, from entry by other league teams."); Quirk and
Fort, Pay Dirt at 240-93 (cited in note 3) (discussing historical competitive balance among
teams in the major sports leagues).
126 J. Quirk and M. El-Hodiri, The Economic Theory of a Professional Sports League, in
R. Noll, Government and the Sports Business 33 (Brookings 1974).
127 See Jones and Gerguson, 36 J Indus Econ at 443 (cited in note 124).
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ships and are sold or "abandoned" less often than teams in small
cities. ' A more recent study of the National Hockey League
("NHL") tested this hypothesis,'29 confirming that there is a posi-
tive association between team quality and the quality of
location. 3 ° Specifically, the researchers found that having a Ca-
nadian location was important to both attendance and team mar-
ket power in the NHL.' Furthermore, the impact of location
upon attendance, market power, and long-run team quality fac-
tored into decisions concerning League expansion and franchise
relocation. 2
These findings are important for confirming the legitimacy of
the location theory, but the point about location can be made
without sophisticated economic models. While a great location
may not guarantee success, large-market teams do have consid-
erably more profit-making potential than their small-market
counterparts. 33 In order to compensate for the disparities among
league teams, MLB and the NFL require varying amounts of gate
revenue-sharing by member teams.3 3 All of the major sports
leagues require an equal distribution of national television reve-
nues, although the leagues differ in the extent to which they rely
on such revenues." 5 These revenue-sharing rules are essentially
"devices by which strong-drawing, big-city teams subsidize weak-
drawing, small-city member teams.""' Even with the revenue-
128 See Quirk and EI-Hodiri, Economic Theory at 58 (cited in note 126).
129 Jones and Gerguson, 36 J Indus Econ at 443-57 (cited in note 124).
130 Id at 445.
131 Id. The validity of this conclusion is in question as NHL teams increasingly move
south and relocate in American cities, with little or no resistance from Canadians. See
Dean Bonham, Ice Gets Thicker for Canadian Hockey, Rocky Mtn News 16G (May 23,
1999) ("Of the six Canadian cities still hosting NHL franchises ... it appears that only
Toronto and Montreal are not in jeopardy of losing their teams in the near future."). See
also, Jim Taylor, Dumb Like the Foxes, Calgary Sun 69 (Dec 10, 1999) (discussing the
acquisition by Americans of many Canadian sports franchises).
132 Jones and Gerguson, 36 J Indus Econ at 443 (cited in note 124).
133 See Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 100 (cited in note 3) ("Predictably, most of the
have-not teams are small market teams."); Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 300 (cited in note
3) (referring to the "disparity in drawing potential among league teams" based at least in
part upon population); David Kennedy, National League Report, <http'/lwww.mcz.com/
sport/baseball2.htm> (visited Jan 29, 2000) ("[T]here is so much financial disparity be-
tween the haves and have-nots that I can sum up in one word who is going to win the AL-
Yankees."). But see Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at 1703, n 121 (cited in note 3) ("Traditionally,
the determining factor between the haves and the have-nots has been market size. How-
ever, teams with new stadiums now have the upper hand, even if they are located in small
markets.").





sharing plans, there is still a tendency for teams located in the
strong-drawing areas to win, on average, more games and cham-
pionships than those located in weak-drawing areas.137
2. The importance of protecting location.
Each professional sports league's franchise relocation rules
operate on a geographical basis, such that the rules inhibit a
team's ability to relocate into another team's territory. As a prac-
tical matter, one or a few league members can block league ex-
pansion or a franchise relocation, especially into an existing fran-
chise's territory.3 ' Thus, the rules protecting teams' "exclusive
territories" permit member franchises to secure a local monopoly
on their home territory within the league.'39
The history of sports league expansion shows that a league
will often pay an existing team when an expansion franchise en-
croaches upon the team's home territory. For example, when the
All-American Football Conference ("AFL") entered the NFL in
1949, the AFL's Baltimore Colts paid the Washington Redskins
$150,000 as compensation for moving into their territory.140 When
the AFL merged with the NFL in 1966, the AFL paid the NFL
$18 million over twenty years, which compensated the San Fran-
cisco Forty-Niners and New York Giants for occupation of their
respective territories.4 Such payments further reveal the value
of exclusive territories to member teams.
137 Id, citing Mohamed El-Hodiri and James Quirk, An Economic Model of a Profes-
sional Sports League, 79 J Pol Econ 1302 (1971), and Simon Rottenberg, The Baseball
Players' Labor Market, 64 J Pol Econ 253 (1956). The one notable exception is the NFL's
Green Bay Packers, who have succeeded in the past despite their small-market location.
Their success, however, may not be too surprising, given that they "play in a league with
gate- and television-sharing arrangements that are the most favorable to weak franchises
of any in professional sports." Quirk and E1-Hodiri, Economic Theory at 44 (cited in note
126).
138 Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 300 (cited in note 3).
139 Quirk and Fort., Hard Ball at 118 (cited in note 3) ("The league franchise is a grant
of a local monopoly within the league to the team owning the franchise."). It is important
here to note that if there were rival leagues challenging the current leagues' monopoly,
then such monopoly profits would not be available to owners. However, due to the signifi-
cant barriers to entry for new leagues, "no professional sports league has survived for
more than a few years in competition with an incumbent league." Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J
at 1695 (cited in note 3).
140 Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 121 (cited in note 3). The League paid the New York
Giants as well. Id. See also, Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 378-478 (cited in note 3) (giving
ownership histories for all franchises in all major professional leagues, including any
payments made to the relevant league upon the franchise's entrance).
141 Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 121-22 (cited in note 3). This practice is not limited to
the NFL. In the context of professional basketball, the New York Nets entered the NBA in
1976 and began playing in the New York Knicks' home territory only after agreeing to pay
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3. Location and the profit motive.
In a model of optimal cooperation among owners to further
the league's best interests, the issue of exclusive territories might
not be so problematic. A relocation into a high-profit, large-
drawing location would be allowed if the net result were more
beneficial for the league overall.'42 However, the league's best in-
terest rarely supersedes the owners' best interest.'
Even though leagues are still essentially joint ventures con-
sisting of cooperative and interdependent entities, individpal
member teams may find it advantageous to vote against the best
interests of the league in order to enhance their own welfare.'
Such egocentrism hinders teams' ability to cooperate and pursue
the best interests of the entire league.'45
the Knicks a $4 million indemnity fee. See McBurney, 60 NYU L Rev at 927 (cited in note
7). See also, Ross, 73 Minn L Rev at 657-58 (cited in note 3) (citing study that concluded
"franchises sharing a local market can expect revenues to fall nearly $3.8 billion below
their monopolistic counterparts.") (citation omitted).
142 Commentators have even argued that allowing entry of a franchise into those big-
city locations in which another franchise currently resides "might well increase profits for
small-city league teams.., because of the league-wide benefits from more teams in the big
cities." Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 301 (cited in note 3). This is unlikely to happen, how-
ever, due to the profit-minded motivations behind franchise relocation restrictions. Id. See
also Ross, 73 Minn L Rev at 657-58 (cited in note 3) (citing study that concluded "fran-
chises sharing a local market can expect revenues to fall nearly $3.8 billion below their
monopolistic counterparts'") (citation omitted).
143 See Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at 1684 (cited in note 3) ("Like the owners of any other
business, team owners are primarily interested in maximizing the return on their invest-
ment."). This is not to deny that there are other non-profit-related explanations for much
of franchise owners' decisions and that some owners are noticeably less affected by the
bottom line than others. See, for example, Quirk and El-Hodiri, Economic Theory at 42-43
(cited in note 126) (qualifying their previous assertions about the profit-maximization
motive among franchise owners).
144 For example, Art Modell, the owner of the Cleveland Browns, who later moved his
team to Baltimore, was "reportedly very vocal in his opposition to the NFL granting an
expansion franchise to Baltimore." Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at 1697 n 91 (cited in note 3),
citing Thomas George, Modell Joins Newest Game in Football, NY Times B9 (Nov 7, 1995).
See also, Mullick, 7 Marq Sports L J at 2 (cited in note 4) ("Both the increased cost and
profit of. .. [football] have intensified competition for the dollar. This pits League mem-
bers against each other."); Roberts, 32 UCLA L Rev at 259-60 (cited in note 47) ("The
peculiar nature of the league product requires revenue-dividing incentives that on infre-
quent, yet significant, occasions give individual clubs a strong financial motive to vote
contrary to the league's best economic interests .... [S]ome important league decisions
cannot be assumed automatically to have been made in the best interests of the league.");
Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 299 (cited in note 3) ("[Lleague decisions are not made on the
basis of maximizing total league profits, but rather on the basis of individual team profit
maximization, and the two do not necessarily always coincide with each other.").
145 Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 114-15 (cited in note 3). See also Piraino, 57 Ohio St
L J at 1686 (cited in note 3) ("In the NFL, the Dallas Cowboys have been the most aggres-
sive in asserting their individual interests over those of the league as a whole. The Cow-
boys, in fact, have openly defied the NFL's rules on revenue sharing.").
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The events that gave rise to Piazza146 demonstrate franchise
owners' ability to stymie any threats to their monopoly profits. A
Tampa Bay investment group secured the contractual right to
purchase the San Francisco Giants and relocate the team to
Tampa Bay, but the deal fell through.147 According to some,
Wayne Huizenga, owner of the Florida Marlins, was partly re-
sponsible for thwarting the move.14 Huizenga allegedly engaged
in behind-closed-doors negotiations to prevent the Tampa Bay
purchase and resisted the relocation unless the investment group
was willing to pay a large transfer fee.
149
Huizenga's alleged motivation for opposing the deal was to
protect his franchise from the adverse financial impact of a sec-
ond team in Florida.5 ° Obviously this is not the kind of coopera-
tion and interdependence that league planners of the past hoped
for.'' Whether or not the relocation was in the League's best in-
terest, a single owner was able to protect his exclusive territory.
Sports leagues sanction such protectionism through relocation
restrictions and, when combined with owner's monopolistic ten-
dencies, these restrictions may harm the league as a whole.
146 Piazza v Major League Baseball, 831 F Supp 420 (E D Pa 1993).
147 See Bob Andelman, Stadium For Rent: Tampa Bay's Quest for Major League Base-
ball, <http://www.mrmedia.con/SFR/sfr-ch26a.html> (visited Jan 29, 2000).
148 See id ("[Huizenga] had just paid $95 million for the privilege of spending $50 mil-
lion more to field a team that is expected to lose one hundred games in 1994. He was not
about to stand idly by and watch an established team move to Florida and dilute his po-
tential cable market.") (citation omitted).
149 Id (citing various newspaper reports and letters).
150 Id. The conflict between Huizenga and the Tampa Bay investors resembles the
recent situation in the Washington, D.C. area. Washington was one of the cities competing
to host the Montreal Expos if they left Montreal. See Richard Justice, D.C. Presents Case
to the Commissioner's Office, Wash Post D1 (Sept 28, 1999). However, Peter Angelos,
owner of the Baltimore Orioles, strongly opposed the relocation, arguing that having a
team in such close proximity would significantly hurt his ticket sales and broadcast reve-
nues. See id; Richard Justice, Gilmore Makes a Strong Pitch, Wash Post D3 (July 14,
1999) ("Washington faces stiff opposition from Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos,
who says he has staked out the area as his own."). Although the Expos never left Mont-
real, Angelos' position raised the potential for "bitter legal and legislative confrontation
involving the Orioles, Major League Baseball, Congress and supporters in the Washington
area." Thom Loverro, Can Angelos Keep Baseball From Coming to Town?, Wash Times Al
(May 23, 1999). See also, Peter Perl, The Pitch, Wash Post W10 (Mar 28, 1999) (describing
the Angelos-Washington situation).
151 See, for example, Mullick, 7 Marq Sports L J at 1 (cited in note 4) (describing Pete
Rozelle, perhaps the NFL's most well-known Commissioner, and his ideology of collectiv-
ism, or "League Think," by which the owners could act with a unified purpose of benefiting
the whole League).
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4. The effects of protecting location.
Rules restricting relocation shelter teams in the best-drawing
locations from competition, even though these teams derive their
higher profits by virtue of their favorable location.152 Exclusive
territory provisions also increase the selling price of any given
franchise because the franchise's value reflects expected monop-
oly rents.'53 Thus, when combined with the artificial scarcity of
league teams, franchise relocation restrictions allow team owners
to enjoy an undivided share of the local monopoly profits5 4 and to
enjoy an inflated market price for their franchises."'
Potential buyers of protected franchises suffer two harms: in-
creased prices for franchises and fewer opportunities to purchase
an undervalued team and relocate it to a more profitable area.'56
152 See Lazaroff, 53 Fordham L Rev at 160 (cited in note 16) (arguing that "prevention
of relocation [into an existing team's territory] ... eliminates the potential for significant
direct economic competition between teams in the same league"); Scibilia, 6 Seton Hall J
Sports L at 445 (cited in note 62) ('The only way a franchise relocation decision could be
anti-competitive would be if a team was blocked in an effort to move into a city in which
there already was a franchise."); Mid-South Grizzlies v National Football League, 720 F2d
772, 787 (3d Cir 1983) ("Conceivably within certain geographic submarkets two league
members compete with one another for ticket buyers, for local broadcast revenue, and for
sale of the concession items like food and beverages and team paraphernalia.").
153 See Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 174 (cited in note 3). It is, of course, possible that
the franchise relocation restrictions may depress franchise prices to a certain degree be-
cause of the restriction upon a buyer's ability to move the team to a better, more profitable
location. Despite this potential balancing effect, courts have emphasized that overall con-
sumer preferences in setting output and prices are more important than higher prices and
lower output, per se, in determining whether there has been an injury to competition. See
Sullivan v National Football League, 34 F3d 1091, 1101 (1st Cir 1994), citing National
Collegiate Athletic Association v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85,
107 (1984) ("NCAA") (finding NCAA television restrictions unlawful because "[p]rice is
higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are unresponsive to con-
sumer preference."). Unresponsiveness to consumer demand, therefore, can support a
finding of anticompetitive effect. See also Sullivan, 34 F3d at 1101 ("[R]egardless of the
exact price effects of the NFL's policy, the overall market effects of the policy are plainly
unresponsive to consumer demand for ownership interests in NFL teams.").
154 This emphasis upon local monopoly profits, while benefiting the individual owner,
may be detrimental to the league's best interest. See Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at 1687 (cited
in note 3) ("In order to fund players' salaries, owners are now trying to maximize their
revenue from local sources .... A strong local revenue stream can give an owner the up-
per hand in attracting the most talented players, because such income is not subject to
revenue sharing under the leagues' bylaws.").
155 See id at 1689 ("Like the members of any other cartel, the owners of professional
sports franchises can charge a higher price for their product if they limit its output. With a
scarcity of franchises, owners can be ensured that they maintain their monopoly lever-
age.").
156 Eliminating the current restriction on entry into protected markets would likely
reduce or eliminate many of the competitive balance problems between large and small
markets. Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 179 (cited in note 3). See also Lazaroff, 53 Ford-
ham L Rev at 212 (cited in note 16) ("[T]eam owners themselves are prevented from seek-
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Franchise relocation restrictions also damage cities that cur-
rently host a franchise because home franchises possess monop-
oly power. 5 7 Such cities cannot act on competing bids from other
franchises seeking to relocate, since the restrictions protect the
local team from such competition.' Franchise relocation restric-
tions thus combine with an artificial dearth of franchises to dis-
tort the franchise market, rendering it functionally unresponsive
to consumer demand.159
5. Effects upon the market for expansion teams.
Some critics argue that insufficient league expansion protects
current owners from competition and that the leagues should
therefore expand. 6 ° Although relocation restrictions are distinct
from the various rules restricting the expansion of sports leagues,
the two types of restrictions interact in important ways.'6'
ing out the best competitive options available to them and from unilaterally seeking
maximum profitability by choosing the location of their teams.").
157 See generally, Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in
the National Football League, 97 Colum L Rev 473, 478-96 (1997) (describing the harms
flowing from team relocations and the disadvantage at which cities currently operate with
respect to home franchises). See also Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 16 (cited in note 3)
("Through exclusive territorial franchises, leagues provide each member team with a local
monopoly in the sport, giving it special bargaining power in its dealings with local radio
and TV stations, with the municipally owned stadium or arena in its city, and even with
the ticket-buying public.").
158 See Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 179-81 (cited in note 3) (concluding that breaking
up sports leagues into rival leagues would lead to multiple teams bidding to play in any
one city, which would reduce the monopoly power that most teams currently have in de-
manding large stadium subsidies or exaggerated selling prices).
159 See id at 136 ("[T]he high ratio of fans to teams in the megalopolis cities is a main
reason for the lack of competitive balance in sports leagues; on the other [hand], this pro-
vides evidence for the argument that leagues restrict the number of franchises in order to
increase league-wide profits, as well as the franchise values of member teams."). A pre-
dictable consequence, for example, of breaking up the current sports leagues into rival
leagues would be the presence of more teams in the presently protected big-city markets.
Id at 178. While this Comment does not propose the break-up of current leagues, these
observations bolster the conclusion that current league practice is unresponsive to pur-
chasers' demand for franchises in big-city markets.
160 For a general discussion, see id at 171-86 (cited in note 3) (arguing that forcing the
leagues to break up the existing monopoly leagues into several independent competing
leagues would solve many of the problems in the sports industry); Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J
1677 (cited in note 3) (arguing for expansion of current sports leagues); and Ross, 73 Minn
L Rev 643 (cited in note 3) (arguing for the break up of MLB and the NFL).
161 In a typical franchise relocation case, the §1 and § 2 analyses are not mutually ex-
clusive and, instead, they inform each other. One commentator points out that most of the
franchise relocation cases would never have been brought if there were competing leagues
because "the prospect of rival league expansion or relocation would make it virtually im-
possible for a city or a maverick owner to prove that the defendant league harmed compe-
tition." Ross, 73 Minn L Rev at 738 (cited in note 3). See also Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at
1677 (cited in note 3) (arguing that franchise owners have conspired to limit the output of
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Expansion fees, which leagues charge new entrants, have
been escalating rapidly.'62 These fees accrue directly to the league
and are shared among its teams. One recent example demon-
strates how franchise relocation restrictions can be utilized to
maximize the benefit of expansion fees to the league and also in-
crease the prices the future buyer pays for the expansion team.
In 1997, Seattle Seahawks owner Ken Behring moved his
team offices from Seattle to Anaheim, California, in preparation
for a team move to Los Angeles."3 Even though Behring had not
yet sought NFL approval of his proposed move, the NFL allegedly
told him bluntly to move back to Seattle.' The NFL claimed that
it acted on principle, not for money, although it stood to gain a
hefty expansion fee for the currently unoccupied LA market.6 '
Indeed, "[t]he last thing the league wants is for some existing
team to move in to claim the LA market and rob the other NFL
teams of their share of the coming expansion fee." 66 Insofar as
franchise relocation restrictions allow the leagues to preserve for
franchises and have enforced the conspiracy through supermajority voting requirements
in the leagues' by-laws). Although their discussion focuses upon the difficulty of adding an
expansion team in the territory of an existing team, the following observations by Quirk
and Fort seem equally applicable to the problem of relocating a team into the territory of
an existing team:
[I]f a new team is placed in the territory of an existing team, then the
existing team at that location is exposed to differential costs not borne by
the other teams in the league. The monopoly position of the existing team
is eliminated .... [And] it is to be expected that total profits at the loca-
tion (summed over both teams) will fall after entry.
Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 301 (cited in note 3).
162 See Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt at 64-67 (cited in note 3) (graphing and explaining
rising expansion fees). Data on expansion fees up to 1990 indicate that in the major sports
leagues they have increased rapidly since the mid-1970's, with current expansion fees over
$100 million. Id. See also Piraino, 57 Ohio St L J at 1729 n 96 (cited in note 3) (noting that
the owners of the Carolina Panthers and Jacksonville Jaguars each paid $140 million to
the NFL in 1995 and the owners of the Toronto Raptors and Vancouver Grizzlies each
paid $125 million to the NBA in 1995).
163 Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 125 (cited in note 3).
164 See id.
165 See id. The NFL could expect an expansion fee of "maybe upward of $750 million"
for the Los Angeles area from an entity such as Disney, Time Warner, or Fox. Id.
166 Id. The NFL's stand was dubious, given that it had just approved Art Modell's
decision to move the Cleveland Browns to Baltimore. Id at 124. Art Modell moved the
Browns to Baltimore in 1997 in exchange for a new $200 million stadium with nominal
rent and extra revenue from luxury boxes and personal seat licenses. Id. Not surprisingly,
Modell had to hand over some of his gains from the Baltimore move to the rest of the
league. Id. See also notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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themselves valuable expansion opportunities, the restrictions
also drive up prices in the expansion market.'67
B. Consumer Interests Are at Stake in the
Market for Sports Franchises
Two of the Supreme Court's primary antitrust concerns, in-
creased prices and restrictions upon output, are at stake in the
franchise relocation restriction debate. 8' Despite these concerns,
courts' and commentators' overwhelming focus on fans as "con-
sumers" of league products prevents them from viewing league
franchises as an entirely distinct league product.'69 Relocation
restrictions may not harm consumers of professional sports, in
that they may not always detract from the quality of the game.
Nonetheless, the purchasers of league franchises feel the effects
of the franchise relocation restrictions, and consumer welfare
analysis indicates that these purchasers should have a remedy in
the antitrust laws.' °
167 For example, the Ninth Circuit recognized the importance to the NFL of the expan-
sion opportunity that the Raiders took when they moved to Los Angeles and limited the
damages allowable for the Raiders' successful antitrust claim. In Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Commission v National Football League, 791 F 2d 1356, 1371 (9th Cir 1986)
("Raiders"), the court explained that:
[Tihe ['expansion opportunity' in Los Angeles] represented an extremely
valuable expansion possibility for the league. . . . If and when the NFL
placed an expansion team in the Los Angeles area, the accumulated value
of the Los Angeles opportunity would have been realized by the NFL
through charging the new expansion team owner for the expansion oppor-
tunity.
See also Weistart, 1984 Duke L J at 1014 (cited in note 44) (arguing that "an exquisite
corporate opportunity-an excellent NFL franchise location" should not be claimable at no
cost by an existing league member since it could be sold for a considerable amount to
someone outside the league).
168 See NCAA, 468 US 85, 107 (finding NCAA television restrictions unlawful because
"[pirice is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are unrespon-
sive to consumer preference"); Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System Inc,
441 US 1, 19-20 (1979) ("[O]ur inquiry must focus on whether ... the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output").
169 See, for example, Roberts, 60 Tul L Rev at 565 n 8 (cited in note 90) ("Even if a
league's product faces no significant competition from other forms of entertainment, the
fans of that league will be better off if the quality of the league's product (i.e., the games
and pennant races) is enhanced and the prices charged lowered.") (emphasis added);
Jacobs, 67 Ind L J at 28 n 12 (cited in note 24) ("If league games are the output of a pro-
fessional sports league, then it is only collective decisions designed to reduce the number
of such games that threaten to diminish consumer welfare.").
170 See Sullivan v Tagliabue, 25 F3d 43, 49 (1st Cir 1994) (acknowledging, in a case
challenging the NFL's rule prohibiting sale of shares of franchise team to any company
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That fans, as consumers of league games, may or may not feel
the effects through changes in ticket prices and output of games
is relevant but not dispositive. 17' The First Circuit recognized this
distinction in Sullivan v National Football League.' 2 That case
involved the NFL's unwritten policy prohibiting the sale of team
ownership interests to the public through offerings of publicly
traded stock. 173 The court concluded that the policy's effect upon
fans was not relevant to a determination of its effects on output
and prices in the relevant market for ownership interests.174
The relevant market at issue in Sullivan-the market for
ownership interests in NFL franchises-is similar to the market
for sports franchises. The consumers in both markets are those
who would like to have an interest in owning and/or controlling a
sports franchise. Sullivan thus illuminates the importance of
consumer welfare analysis in a franchise relocation restriction
case. Like the plaintiffs in Sullivan, purchasers in the market for
sports franchises suffer from league-imposed market distortion.
In accordance with the Sherman Act's "consumer welfare pre-
scription,"1 5 these consumers should have a remedy in the anti-
trust laws.
C. The Advantages of the Sports Franchise Market Definition
Few commentators have addressed the propriety of the sports
franchise market definition, perhaps because it rarely appears in
the case law.' 6 One can surmise from the principles underlying
other market definition proposals whether their adherents would
support or oppose the sports franchise market definition.
not engaged in the business of professional football, that purchasers of NFL franchises
were the "intended victims of the alleged antitrust violation").
171 See Piazza v Major League Baseball, 831 F Supp at 439-40 (recognizing that the
consumers in the product market for the business of baseball are fans and, perhaps, the
broadcast industry, while the consumers in the product market for existing professional
sports teams are "those who would like to become team owners").
172 34 F3d 1091, 1100-01 (1st Cir 1994).
173 Id at 1095.
174 Id at 1101 n 3 ("Just because consumers of 'NFL football' are not affected by output
controls and price increases does not mean that consumers of a product in the relevant
market are not so affected. In this case, NFL policy denied products to two types of con-
sumers: consumers who want to buy stock of the Patriots or other teams, and consumers
like [plaintiffl who want to 'purchase' investment capital in the market for public financ-
ing.").
175 Reiter v Sonotone Corp, 442 US 330, 343 (1979). See also notes 20-24 and accompa-
nying text.
176 But see Roberts, 32 UCLA L Rev at 301 n 249 (cited in note 47) (referring to the
market definition in North American Soccer League as "a contrived sports capital market
that did not truly reflect the market in which consumer interests were at stake").
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1. The entertainment market proponents.
Ardent league supporters tend to advocate the entertainment
market definition over narrower market definitions, such as the
sports franchise market. 7 7 According to league supporters, the
broad entertainment definition is the next best thing to sports
leagues' complete exemption from the antitrust laws."8 Under the
broader market definition, more league practices will be upheld
because the defendant league's market power will be small.179 The
leagues, therefore, will be able to make more efficiency-enhancing
decisions without the interference of judges and juries inexperi-
enced in the business of operating a sports league.' 0
However appealing the broad entertainment market defini-
tion may be, it results in a de facto antitrust exemption for pro-
fessional sports leagues. 8' One court has specifically rejected the
broad entertainment market for the precise reason that it makes
the rule of reason virtually useless as a means of identifying un-
reasonable restraints. In Conigio v Highwood Services, Inc,"8 2 the
Second Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the "gen-
eral entertainment market in Buffalo" was the relevant market
because that market was "so broadly defined as to render [the
market] concept all but meaningless as an analytical tool for as-
sessing the anti-competitive effect requisite to a Sherman Act
violation.""3 Although removing sports leagues from per se scru-
177 See Kennedy, 46 UCLA L Rev at 602 (cited in note 56) (arguing that defining the
market more narrowly than the "entertainment market" "results in a severe disadvantage
to defendant leagues").
178 Id at 610 (arguing that "It]eams must be able to reach horizontal agreements... for
the league to compete in the entertainment market"); Grauer, 82 Mich L Rev at 34-35
(cited in note 20) ("The NFL is a single entity that has no monopoly power when compet-
ing against other forms of entertainment. Consequently, it should be left to its own devices
in determining what action will make it more efficient, more profitable and its product
more marketable.").
179 See, for example, Lazaroff, 20 Ariz St L J at 975 (cited in note 78) ("If [the enter-
tainment market definition] is correct, the market share of the NFL or NBA will neces-
sarily be rather small. This model generally leads to the conclusion that the anticompeti-
tive impact of an intraleague restraint is de minimis within the broadly defined market.").
180 See Kennedy, 46 UCLA L Rev at 620 (cited in note 56) ("By simply allowing league
planners to plan, the judiciary would be allowing them to decide for themselves the most
efficient method of operation.").
181 Id at 620-22 (arguing for a per se legality standard for sports leagues' internal
restraints); Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 781 (cited in note 14) ("Not only should [the
sport's industry's unique characteristics] provide a sufficient basis to avoid per se invalid-
ity, they should also be enough to overcome liability under the rule of reason.").
182 Coniglio v Highwood Services, Inc, 495 F2d 1286 (2d Cir 1974).
183 Id at 1292. See also Lazaroff, 20 Ariz St L J at 982 (cited in note 78) ("[T]he sugges-
tion that professional football is part of a general entertainment market seems no more
sensible than the assertion that men's suits are merely an economically indistinct part of a
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tiny makes good sense,' there does not appear to be a principled
reason for emasculating the rule-of-reason analysis, as the enter-
tainment market definition does.'85
Absent congressional legislation exempting sports leagues
from antitrust regulation,'86 sports leagues remain subject to the
Sherman Act. 87 If the leagues are in fact sufficiently unique that
antitrust scrutiny is inherently improper, then congressional ex-
emption is warranted.' Short of an exemption, sports leagues
should have to answer for any anticompetitive conduct that
harms consumer interests in the sports franchise market.
2. The single-sport market proponents.
Proponents of the single-sport market definition would likely
be more receptive to the sports franchise market definition than
would proponents of the entertainment market definition.8 9 Sin-
gle-sport market proponents are generally critical of broad mar-
general men's clothing market or that snack foods are simply one part of a general food
market.").
184 See notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
1s5 See Lazaroff, 20 Ariz St L J at 987 (cited in note 78) ("Well-established antitrust
doctrine should not be distorted or ignored to achieve preferred status for a particular
industry."); John Scura, The Time Has Come: Ending The Antitrust Non-Enforcement
Policy In Professional Sports, 2 Seton Hall J Sport L 151, 151 (1992) ("In the area of fed-
eral antitrust regulation professional sports have been granted special allowances un-
heard of in other industries . . . . The industry of professional sports is financially strong,
and should not be permitted to engage in unfair trade practices.").
186 See Cotrupe, 9 DePaul-LCA J Art & Enter L at 174-85 (cited in note 69) (discuss-
ing the various attempts at removing sports leagues from antitrust scrutiny in the sports
franchise relocation context, all of which have been unsuccessful).
187 See Jacobs, 67 Ind L J at 30 (cited in note 24) ("[Wlhile professional sports leagues
might initially appear to be significantly different from other joint ventures, the difference
is functionally superficial and does not justify a fundamental departure from the antitrust
rules applicable to other joint ventures."); Rosenbaum, 41 U Miami L Rev at 779 (cited in
note 14) ("[Dleclaring the industry unique does not insulate sports leagues from the anti-
trust laws.").
1S See Lazaroff, 20 Ariz St L J at 987 (cited in note 78) ("Much of the criticism of
sports antitrust cases really seems to argue that unbridled competition does not work well
for sports leagues. This argument is better addressed to Congress, which can provide a
statutory immunity of some kind if it so chooses.").
189 In fact, the market for existing franchises might be a submarket of the single-sport
market if investors were to invest in only one particular league's franchises. See Brown
Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294, 325 (1962) (stating that within the relevant product
market "well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product mar-
kets for antitrust purposes."). See also Roberts, 32 UCLA L Rev at 257, n 135 (cited in
note 47) ("While each league does operate in the larger market for entertainment products
... that does not necessarily exclude other relevant submarkets.).
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ket definitions, such as the entertainment market, and often offer
the more narrow single-sport market as an alternative.9 °
The single-sport market definition avoids some of the prob-
lems of the entertainment market definition, but both emphasize
that fans are the relevant consumers of sports leagues'
products. 9' The market for sports franchises is preferable to both
the single-sport market and the entertainment market defini-
tions because it recognizes that relocation restrictions injure pur-
chasers in the sports franchise market.'92 Thus, the best way to
serve the purpose of the antitrust laws is to define the relevant
product market in sports franchise relocation cases as the market
for sports franchises.
CONCLUSION
Selfish motivations, scarcity of sports franchises, and fran-
chise relocation restrictions all combine to distort the franchise
market in professional sports leagues. Indeed, defendant leagues
have thwarted some relocations presenting arguable benefits to
both fans and the league overall, while allowing other moves that
appeared to be driven solely by economic self-interest.193
Sports fans who lose a beloved home team suffer harm, espe-
cially emotional harm. The economic effects of franchise reloca-
tion restrictions, however, manifest themselves primarily in the
market for sports franchises. Courts should adopt the market for
190 For example, Professors Lazaroff and Roberts engaged in a back-and-forth debate
over the proper market definition, with Professor Lazaroff advocating the single-sport
market and Professor Roberts advocating the entertainment market. See Lazaroff, 20 Ariz
St L J 953 (cited in note 78) (responding to Professor Roberts's article).
191 See, for example, Roberts, 61 S Cal L Rev at 984 (cited in note 42) ("It is of no rele-
vance that challenged conduct may adversely affect an individual team, a stadium, a
community, or the players, unless that effect can be translated into an overall injury to
consumer interests."); Lazaroff, 20 Ariz St L J at 985 (cited in note 78) (arguing that if
relocation restraints are permitted, "Prices will exceed the social optimum and output will
be lower than that optimum. Consumer choice will be eliminated if teams collectively
insulate themselves from rivalry for fans within well-defined geographic markets.").
192 See Sashe Dimanin Dimitroff, Whose Field of Dreams: Antitrust Relief Against
Restrictions on the Sale or Relocation of Major League Baseball Teams, 42 Antitrust Bull
521, 522 (1997) ("Member teams may find it economically advantageous to vote against
having another team sold or relocated, especially into their territories. Potential buyers
and sellers of major league baseball teams, however, have historically been left without a
federal antitrust remedy for such actions, no matter how arbitrary, capricious, or mean-
spirited.").
193 See wunderli, 5 Marq Sports L J at 83-86 (cited in note 4) (discussing various
relocations and proposed relocations); Quirk and Fort, Hard Ball at 118-29 (cited in note
3) (same).
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sports franchises as the relevant product market in sports fran-
chise relocation cases, because of its superior focus on the objects
of antitrust laws' concern.
